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Abstract
Natural philosophy necessarily combines the process of scientific observation with
an abstract (and usually symbolic) framework, which provides a logical structure to the
development of a scientific theory. The metaphysical underpinning of science includes
statements about the process of science itself, and the nature of both the philosophical
and material objects involved in a scientific investigation. By developing a formalism for
an abstract mathematical description of inherently non-mathematical, physical objects,
an attempt is made to clarify the mechanisms and implications of the philosophical tool
of Ansatz. Outcomes of the analysis include a possible explanation for the philosoph-
ical issue of the ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of mathematics as raised by Wigner, and
an investigation into formal definitions of the terms: principles, evidence, existence and
universes that are consistent with the conventions used in physics. It is found that the
formalism places restrictions on the mathematical properties of objects that represent the
tools and terms mentioned above. This allows one to make testable predictions regarding
physics itself (where the nature of the tools of investigation is now entirely abstract) just
as scientific theories make predictions about the universe at hand. That is, the mathemati-
cal structure of objects defined within the new formalism has philosophical consequences
(via logical arguments) that lead to profound insights into the nature of the universe, which
may serve to guide the course of future investigations in science and philosophy, and pre-
cipitate inspiring new avenues of research.
∗jonathan.hall@adelaide.edu.au
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1 Introduction
The study of physics requires both scientific observation and philosophy. The tenants of sci-
ence and its axioms of operation are not themselves scientific statements, but philosophical
statements. The profound philosophical insight precipitating the birth of physics was that
scientific observations and philosophical constructs, such as logic and reasoning, could be
married together in a way that allowed one to make predictions of observations (in science)
based on theorems and proofs (in philosophy). This natural philosophy requires a philosophi-
cal ‘leap’, in which one makes an assumption or guess about what abstract framework applies
most correctly. Such a leap, called Ansatz, is usually arrived at through inspiration and an inte-
grated usage of faculties of the mind, rather than a programmatic application of certain axioms.
Nevertheless, a programmatic approach allows enumeration of the details of a mathematical
system. It seems prudent to apply a programmatic approach to the notion of Ansatz itself and
to clarify its process metaphysically, in order to gain a deeper understanding of how it is used
in practice in science; but first of all, let us begin with the inspiration.
2 A metaphysical approach
In this work, a programme is laid out for addressing the philosophical mechanism of Ansatz. In
physics, a scientific prediction is made firstly by arriving at a principle, usually at least partly
mathematical in nature. The mathematical formulation is then guessed to hold in particular
physical situations. The key philosophical process involved is exactly this ‘projecting’ or
‘matching’ of the self-contained mathematical formulation with the underlying principles of
the universe. No proof is deemed possible outside the mathematical framework, for proof,
as an abstract entity, is an inherent feature of a mathematical (and philosophical) viewpoint.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what tools a proof-like verification in a non-mathematical
context may use or require.
It may be that the current lack of clarity in the philosophical mechanism involved in apply-
ing mathematical principles to the universe has implications for further research in physics. For
example, in fine-tuning problems of the Standard Model of particle interactions (such as for the
mass of the Higgs boson1, 2 and the magnitude of the cosmological constant3) it has been spec-
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ulated that the existence of multiple universes may alleviate the mystery surrounding them,4–8
in that a mechanism for obtaining the seemingly finely-tuned value of the quantity would no
longer be required- it simply arises statistically. However, if such universes are causally dis-
connected, e.g. in disjoint ‘bubbles’ in Linde’s chaotic inflation framework,9, 10 there is a great
challenge in even demonstrating such universes’ existence, and therefore draws into question
the rather elaborate programme of postulating them. Setting aside for the time being the use
of approaches that constitute novel applications of known theories, such as the exploitation of
quantum entanglement to obtain information about the existence of other universes,11 a more
abstract and philosophical approach is postulated in this paper.
2.1 The universality of mathematics
Outside our universe, one is at a loss to intuit exactly which physical principles continue to
hold. For example, could one assume a Minkowski geometry, and a causality akin to our cur-
rent understanding, to hold for other universes and the ‘spaces between’, if indeed the universes
are connected by some sort of spacetime? Indeed, such questions are perhaps too speculative
to lead to any real progress; however, if one takes the view of Mathematical Realism, which
often underpins the practice of physics, as argued in Section 3, and the tool of Ansatz, one
can at least identify mathematical principles as principles that should hold in any physical
situation- our universe, or any other. This viewpoint is more closely reminiscent of Level IV
in Tegmark’s taxonomy12 of universes. One may imagine that mathematical theorems and
logical reasoning hold in all situations, and that all ‘universes’ (a term in need of a careful
definition to match closely with the sense it is meant in the practice of physics) are subject to
mathematical inquiry. In that case, mathematics (and indeed, our own reasoning) may act as a
‘telescope to beyond the universe’ in exactly the situation where all other senses and tools are
drawn into question.
To achieve the goal of examining the process of the Ansatz- of matching a mathematical
idea to a non-mathematical entity (or phenomenon), one needs to be able to define a non-
mathematical object abstractly, or mathematically. Of course, such an entity that can be written
down and manipulated is indeed not ‘non-mathematical’. This is so in the same way that, in
daily speech, an object can be referred to only by making an abstraction (c.f. ‘this object’,
‘what is meant by this object’ ‘what is meant by the phrase ‘what is meant by this object’
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’, etc.). This nesting feature is no real stumbling block, as one can simply identify it as an
attribute of a particular class of abstractions- those representing non-mathematical objects.
Thus a rudimentary but accurate formulation of non-mathematical objects in a mathematical
way will form the skeleton outline for a new and fairly general formalism.
After developing a mathematics of non-mathematical objects, one could then apply it to
a simple test case. Using the formalism, one could derive a process by which an object is
connected or related somehow to its description, using only the theorems and properties known
to hold in the new framework. The formalism could then be applied to the search for other
universes, and the development of a procedure to identify properties of such universes. In
doing so, one could make a real discovery so long as the phenomenological properties are not
introduced ‘by hand’. This follows the ethos of physics, whereby an inspired principle (or
principles) is followed, sometimes superficially remote from a phenomenon being studied, but
which has profound implications not always perceived contemporaneously (and not introduced
artificially), which ultimately guide the course of an inquiry or experiment.
There is an additional motivation behind this programme beyond addressing the mech-
anism of the Ansatz, which is to attempt to clarify philosophically Wigner’s ‘unreasonable
effectiveness’ of mathematics13 itself. It is the hope of this paper to identify this kind of ‘ef-
fectiveness’ as a kind of fine-tuning problem, i.e. that it is simply a feature that naturally arises
from the structure of the new formalism.
2.2 Evidences
In the special situation where one uses mathematical constructs exclusively, the type of evi-
dence required for a new discovery would also need to be mathematical in nature, and testing
that it satisfies the necessary requirements to count as evidence in the usual scientific sense
could be achieved by using mathematical tools within the new framework. To explain how this
might be done, consider that evidence is usually taken to mean an observation (or collection of
observations) about the universe that supports the implications of a mathematical formulation
prescribed by a particular theory. Therefore, it is necessary to have a strict separation between
objects that are considered ‘real/existing in the universe’, and those that are true mathematical
statements that may be applied or projected (correctly or otherwise) onto the universe.
Note that, for evidence in the usual sense, any observations experienced by the scientist
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are indeed abstractions also. For example, in examining an object, photons reflected from its
surface can interact in the eye to produce a signal in the brain, and the interpretation of such a
signal is an object of an entirely different nature to that of the actual photons themselves- much
observational data is, in fact, discarded, and most crucially, the observation is then fitted into
an abstract framework constructed in the mind. In a very proper sense, the more abstract is the
more tangible to experience, and the more material is the more alien to experience. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to suggest that a definition of evidence in familiar scientific settings is
already equivalent to evidence in an entirely mathematical framework; in fact, the distinction
between the two is purely convention.
3 Mathematical Realism
3.1 Historical Background
In the ‘world of ideals’ (as developed from the notion of Plato’s ‘universals’,14 rather than
Berkeley’s Idealism15) there are certain abstract objects (‘labels’ or ‘pointers’), which refer to
material objects. The Ansatz arises by guessing and then assuming a particular connection
between those pointers and other abstract objects. This allows material objects to be entirely
objective, (to avoid solipsism), but also entirely subservient in some sense, to abstract ob-
jects. An observer can only indirectly interact via interpretation. Thus, the abstract affects the
abstract, and abstract the physical.
One might argue, contrarily, that entities existing in the abstract mind are altered via natural
or material means.16 Certain mental states are invoked upon interpretation of the empirical,
regardless of the existence of patterns, which are abstractions (and that this would be true
even if the universe were ‘unreasonable’- not in general amenable to rational inquiry). It is
the point of view expounded in this treatise, however, that it is not true that material objects
can interact so directly with other material objects, but only indirectly, since the interactions
themselves would otherwise need to be materials. Yet an interaction is necessarily an abstract
link (i.e. it has to follow some pattern, rule or law) even when at rest. That is, the notion of
‘interaction’ is necessarily abstract. It is the feature of positing only indirect relation among
physical objects that takes the form of a view opposite to that of epiphenomenalism.16, 17 The
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difference in viewpoint may appear to hinge on the semantics of the terms ‘interaction’ and
‘abstract’, but the goal is simply to characterise the oft-proved successful methods of physics
as already applied in practice, through a particular choice in philosophy. Our goal is, by simply
identifying (and thus labelling) the salient features of the philosophy, an investigation into the
more general (and philosophical) aspects of the practice of physics can be conducted. On the
other hand, the discussion of the soundness of such a philosophy on other grounds constitutes
a tangent topic, and the presentation of a complete enumeration of various emendations or
contrary viewpoints on the choice of philosophy will be left for further investigation.
3.2 Contemporary developments
The evolution of metaphysics from rudimentary Cartesian Dualism18 to that proposed by
Bohm19 demonstrates the usefulness of a mathematical viewpoint in clarifying an enriching
philosophical ideas as they pertain to physics, and the universe as a whole. Abstract relation-
ships are centralised, and underlying principles of matter, rather than a catalogue of the im-
mediate properties, are interpreted to have the greater influence in accessing the fundamental
nature of the physical world. The shift in perspective is that the simple and elegant descrip-
tions of a physical system are those which incorporate its seemingly disparate features into an
integrated whole. One then goes on to postulate a relationship between the physical object in
question and the machinery of its abstract description.
Similar philosophical views have found success in the field of neuroscience, such as the
work of Dama´sio in characterising consciousness.20, 21 Instead of treating the mind and body as
separate entities, one postulates an integrated system, whereby mechanisms in the body, such
as internal and external stimuli, result in neurological expressions such as emotion. Emotion
and reason are thus brought together on equal footing, since both actions are the result of com-
paring and evaluating a variety of stimuli, including other emotions, to arrive at a response.
That is, from a modern perspective, just as relationships between physical objects are funda-
mental in characterising the intangible properties of their whole, it is the abstract relationships
between faculties in the body and brain, such as interactions and stimuli, that characterise
consciousness.
The identification of phenomena with abstract descriptions, such as behaviour and interac-
tions, was formalised in Putnam and Fodor’s Functionalism.22, 23 Functionalism provides the
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ability to consider indirect or ‘second order’ explanations for the nature of objects. Unlike
Physicalism, which identifies the nature of objects with the instances themselves that occur in
the real-world, Functionalism entails the generalisation of the objects in terms of their func-
tional behaviour. These more general classes of object are identified by the features that all
relevant instances of the object have in common, and so the nature of the object becomes more
ubiquitous, even if more abstract. This may be nothing more than a semantic shift, in cases
where one is at liberty to allow the definitions of certain abstractions more scope as needed
(such as pain or consciousness), so that they more closely match their use in daily human
endeavours. Further abstractions, such as ‘causes’, an integral part of many areas of science,
follow naturally.
Taken on its own, Functionalism represents a deprecated metaphysic, insufficient for a
complete account of internal states of a physical system,24 and is therefore commonly em-
ployed simultaneously with another metaphysic (such as Physicalism). By not providing for
a ‘real’ or material existence independent of an object’s functional behaviour, a bare Func-
tional philosophy is not wholly suitable for describing the process of physics, which involves
identifying material objects whilst projected upon them an Ansatz from some (abstract) theory.
As an example of the shift in perspective that Functionalism brings, consider the following
scenario of an abstract entity based on real-world observations, such as an emotion/state of
affairs, etc., whose cause is in want of identifying. Let this object be denoted a ‘feature’.
Instead of the cause simply being identified specific phenomenon, or a mechanism based on
the real world, the cause is characterised by an abstract object, G, which represents a collection
of pointers to the relevant parts of the mechanism. If we posit, for the moment, an abstract
interpreting function, i : R → A, relating the real-world, R, to the world of ideals, A, and
similarly, a pointer function, r : A → R, one can establish a relationship between the cause
and the feature. For a mechanism, M , a set of features, F , and an element g1 ∈ G, define
M = r(g1), which resides in r(G), and then i(r(g1)) = i(M) = F . In this (fairly loose)
symbolic description, the features and the cause are related in the statement i(r(G)) = F . The
‘reverse-epiphenomenal’ philosophy, akin to Interactionism, is to realise that the relation itself
between the two entities is an abstract one, whose attributes it will benefit us to characterise.
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4 Formalism
In this section, a new formalism is outlined in order to capture the essential features of the
philosophical problem at hand. A set of very general abstraction operators are defined, such
that they may act upon each other in composition. By introducing another special kind of
operation, the projection P , general objects may be constructed such that they, at the outset,
obey the basic principles expected to hold for objects and attributes used in a recognisable
context, such as in language. To avoid semantic trouble, when one is free to assume or assign
a property in a given context, the choice made is that which is most closely aligned with
‘what is commonly understood’ by a term. Note that other definitions are (unless logically
non-viable) completely acceptable also- it is simply a choice of convenience to try to align
the concepts chosen to be investigated with those of a language (such as a spoken or written
language). In fact, it is judicious to do so, given that any philosophical problems one may wish
to address are usually cast in such a language.
4.1 Projective algebra and abstraction classes
Though Cantor’s Theorem25 prohibits a consistent scheme classifying the space of all such
abstract entities, (as echoed by Schmidhuber5), the abstractions considered here are limited
to a set, W , of ‘world objects’, representing a set of a specific type of object with certain
(very general) properties. Very little mandatory structure for the objects, w, inhabiting W is
assumed, and they may be represented by a set, a group or other more specific mathematical
objects. Thus, one may define W in a consistent fashion using an appropriate axiomization,
such as that of ZFC,26 so long as none of the properties of the formalism is contravened.
In Section 4.2.3, the properties of the real-world objectsw are clarified. Some basic rules of
composition are assumed, but the spaces mapped-into in doing so are simply definitions rather
than theorems; the tone of this work is not to impose any more specific details on the frame-
work than is required in order to fulfill the aforementioned goals, namely, the construction of
a mathematical-like theory in order to address the mechanism of Ansa¨tze. Other mathematical
formulations for obtaining general information about a system, such as Deutsch’s Constructor
Theory,27 take a similar approach in determining suitable definitions for objects required for
certain tasks in an inquiry.
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4.1.1 The labelling principle
Firstly, the projection operator, P , obeys what shall be known as the labelling principle:
P ◦ P = P. (1)
A direct consequence of the labelling principle is that P has no inverse, P−1.
Proof: Assume P−1 exists. Then:
P ◦ P−1 = P
6= 1. Therefore, P−1 DNE.
where 1 is the identity operator. An equivalent argument follows for an operatorP−1 acting
on the left of P .
The projection operator may be applied to a world object w, and the resultant form, P(w),
constitutes a new object, inhabiting a different space from that of w. Firstly, the consequences
of the lack of inverse of P directly affect the projected space PW , which will be interpreted
philosophically in the next section. Suffice to say, the judicious design of PW lends itself to
a particular view of abstractions, whereby very little information can be gained from an object
in the real world directly, as expostulated regarding the definition of evidence, in Section 2.2.
4.1.2 Abstractions
The notion of ‘abstraction’ is codified by postulating a certain operator A, which may act
on objects residing in a space W , much like the projection operator. It will have, however,
different properties to those of the projection operator. Using the abstraction operator, one
is able to go ‘up a level’, (A ◦ A(w) 6= A(w)), and establish new features of the object w.
The sequential application of the abstraction operator creates a chain, in a reminiscent fashion
to that of (co-)homologies;28 however, the properties of the abstraction operators are more
general.
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One may define the abstraction classes, Ωi, as
1 ∈ Ω0, (2)
A ∈ Ω1, (3)
A ◦ A ∈ Ω2, (4)
.
.
. (5)
For the moment, the properties of the classes are no more extensive than, say, a collection of
elements (the operators). The range of A, namely Ω1 ≡ {Ai}, is a class of any type of A.
(What is meant by the set symbols { } will be discussed in Section 4.2.2.) It follows that, for
w ∈ W , Ω0(w) = w ∈ W .
The sequential actions of the projection and the abstraction operators do not cancel each
other, and it can be shown that A ◦ P(w) 6= w:
Theorem 1. A ◦ P(w) 6= w.
Proof: Assume A ◦ P(w) = w. Then:
A ◦ P ∈ Ω0
⇒ A ◦ P = 1
⇒ A = P−1, DNE.
Thus, A ◦ P(w) ∈ Ω1(P(w)), for some w ∈ Ω0(w).
Consider the complex of maps:
Ω0 → Ω1 → Ω2 · · ·
↓ցχ ↓ ↓
P Ω0 P Ω1 P Ω2 · · ·
It is possible to design a function, χ ≡ P◦A, which exists, and will be utilised in Section 4.2.3.
However, it is important to note that our constraints on P do not allow the construction of a
function ϕ : P Ω0 → P Ω1, or any other mapping between projections of abstraction classes.
Mathematically, ϕ would have the form P◦A◦P−1, which does not exist; but philosophically,
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it is supposed of P(w) that it encode the behaviour of the actual world object meant by w. One
interprets the ‘non-mathematical’ object, P(w) ∈ PW , knowing that the fact it is necessarily
an abstraction is already encoded in the behaviour of P by construction. Note that the failure
to construct a function ϕ as a composite of abstraction operators and their inverses does not
mean that such a mapping does not exist. However, the principal motivation for supposing the
non-existence of such a function is to encode the features one expects in an abstract modelling
of non-abstract objects.
This view of the general structure of abstraction is an opposite view to the metaphysic
of epiphenomenalism,16, 17 in that, colloquially speaking, changes to ‘real-world’ objects can
only occur via some abstract state, and it does not make sense to set up a relationship between
non-mathematical entities and insist that such a relationship must be non-abstract.
Different instances of w cannot be combined in general, but their abstractions can be com-
pared by composition. The objects A(w1) and A(w2) can also be defined to be comparable,
via use of the commutators, in Section 4.1.3.
In considering the properties of Ω0(W ), one finds that
Ω0(Ω0(W )) =W (6)
⇒ Ω0 ◦ Ω0 = Ω0. (7)
Generalising to higher abstraction classes, we find the level addition property:
Ωi ◦ Ωj = Ωi+j . (8)
The non-uniqueness of A means that many abstract objects can describe an element of W . In
general, Ai ◦ Aj(w) 6= Aj ◦ Ai(w), so Ω1(Ai(w)) 6= Ai(Ω1(w)), though both Ω1(Ai(w))
and Ai(Ω1(w)) are in Ω2(w). The set Ω0 includes the identity operator 1, but also contains
elements constructed from abstractions and other inverses, e.g. A−1L,i ◦ Aj(w), to be discussed
in Section 4.1.4.
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4.1.3 Commutators
Define the commutator as an operator that takes the elements of the ith order abstraction space,
acting on a world object w1, to the same abstraction space acting on another world object w2,
Φ
i
W=Ω0(W ) : Ω
i(w1)→ Ωi(w2). The subscripts on the commutator symbol indicate the space
inhabited by the objects whose abstractions are to be commuted, and the labels of the discarded
and added objects, respectively. The superscript denotes the order of abstraction (plus one) at
which the commutation takes place. As a simple example,Φ
1
W,1,2A(w1) = A(w2). In general,
let
Φ
1
W,i,jA(wi) = A(wj), (9)
Φ
2
Ω1(w),i,jAk ◦ Ai(w) = Ak ◦ Aj(w), (10)
andΦ
b+1
Ωb(w),i,jA ◦ · · · ◦ A
b
i ◦ · · · ◦ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(w) = A ◦ · · · ◦ Abj ◦ · · · ◦ A(w). (11)
In order to construct the new object from the old object, one must successively apply ‘inverse’
operations of the relevant abstractions to the left of the old object (as discussed in the next
section), and rebuild the new object by re-applying the abstractions. This is not possible in
general, where objects may include operators that have no inverse, such as the projection
operator.
4.1.4 The left inverse of the abstraction
Define the left inverse
A−1L ◦ A = 1, (12)
or more generally, A−1L ◦ A(w) = w. A right inverse is not assumed to exist in general, which
will be important in establish certain kinds of properties in Section 4.3.
As a generalization, one can define a chain of negatively indexed abstraction classes Ω−|i|.
The level addition property can accommodate this scenario. The elements of Ω0 are populated
by objects of the formA−1L,i ◦Aj, orAi◦A−1L,j ◦Ak ◦A−1L,n, etc. That is, successive abstractions
and inverses in any combination such that the resulting abstraction space is order zero. This
includes the identity operator.
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By using the left inverse, it can be shown that the following theorem holds (which comple-
ments Theorem 1), as a consequence of the choice of the philosophical properties of P:
Theorem 2. P ◦ A(w) 6= w.
Proof: Assume Ω−2 6= Ω−1, and P = A−1L . Then:
P ◦ P(w) = A−1L ◦ A
−1
L (w)
= P(w) (Eq. (1))
= A−1L (w)
⇒ A−1L ◦ A
−1
L = A
−1
L ⇒⇐
As a corollary, it also follows that
P ◦ A(w) 6= A ◦ P(w). (13)
In summary, this non-commutativity property of the abstraction operators in Eq. 13 is
an important consequence of the reverse-epiphenomenal philosophical motivation behind the
labelling principle, and it will be the starting point for the construction of the generalised
objects in Section 4.2.3.
4.1.5 Auxiliary maps
In order for a successful description of the relationships among different objects in general, a
definition of the mapping between objects of the form AP(w1) and AP(w2) is sought.
Up until now, maps of the following types have been considered:
• w → A(w), where the notion of the map itself is an abstraction of A of the form:
Amap ◦ A ∈ Ω2(w);
• A ◦ A(w)→ w, where the map is now of the form Amap ◦ A ◦ A ∈ Ω3(w), and
• A(w)→ w, identical to the first case, except that the direction is reversed. By convention,
let the definition of map be chosen such that the direction of mapping is not important, but
simply the relationship between the two objects. Therefore, the map is always taken such that
it exists in a space Ωi≥1, that is, we define it as the modulus of the map. Note that each of these
maps is constructed as a composite of other abstractions, and shall be denoted literal maps.
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It cannot, in general, be attested that there is no such mapping between some w1 and w2
in W . However, one is free to define to exist a non-composite type of map, denoted auxiliary
maps, which relate objects of the form AP(w1) and AP(w2), or APA1(w) and APA2(w),
etc. The map itself exists in the space Ω1(w), that is, the application of what is meant by the
map does not change the order of the objects to which it is applied.
Using the concept of auxiliary maps, a generalized version of the commutator, denoted ˆΦ,
may be defined in a way not possible for the naı¨ve construction of the commutator
ˆ
Φ
2
Ω1(w),i,jAPAi(w) = APAj(w). (14)
The auxiliary commutator will be important for the neat formulation of the general condition
for a specific kind of existence, in Sec 4.3.
4.1.6 The total set
One may define the total set of an object w as
S(w) =
∞⋃
i=0
Ωi(w), (15)
S(P(w)) =
∞⋃
i=0
Ωi ◦ P(w). (16)
The
⋃
symbol denotes the range of the multiple objects, indexed by an integer i, j, etc. over
which the set should be specified. Here, one postulates a certain supposition of physics, that
PS(w) spans at least W .
Supposition 1. P is surjective, i.e. ∀wi ∈ W, ∃σi ∈ S(wi) such that P(σi) = wi.
This condition represents the ‘working ethos’ of the practice of physics. It is expected that
there is some abstract description, however elaborate or verbose, to describe every real-world
object.
4.2 Relationships
In this section, the tools introduced in the preceding section will be used to define more general
relationships between objects. In addition, a generalised object notation will be defined, and
the nature of the real-world objects w will be clarified.
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4.2.1 Ansa¨tze
An Ansatz is formed by adding a structure, or additional layer of abstraction, and imposing
it on what one considers ‘the real world’. Cast in the new framework, this is simply the
successive application of an abstraction and a projection operator upon some object
Zi(w) = P ◦ Ai(w). (17)
As a consequence of the labelling principle in Eq. (1), the Ansatz of an object, w, and what
is meant by the real-world object corresponding to w, cannot be related directly, recalling that
ϕ : P ◦ A(w) → P(w) does not exist. This simply means that there is no way of generating
the label of an object directly from the object itself; it is a free choice. The Ansatz is akin to
the statement: ‘let this new label (with possible additional information) be linked to the real
object’. The notion of Ansatz, particularly the special examples considered in Sec. 4.3, will be
useful in understanding the formal structure of existence as it pertains to real-world objects.
4.2.2 Collections and relationships
A collection or set of objects, {wi} (indexed by integer i), in the formalism, is simply treated
as an abstraction, Aset, used in conjunction with a commutator:
{w1, . . . , wN} =
N⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jwi. (18)
By further imposing that there should be a relationship (other than the collection itself) among
the objects wi, the addition information is simply added by another abstraction, say, A′, and
what is meant be this particular relationship is simply:
r(wi) = P A
′ ◦
N⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jwi. (19)
A relationship in general, r = A′ ◦ Φ
1
A ∈ Ω2, does not have to specify that there be a
particular relationship among objects wi.
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Example: In identifying a ‘type’ of object, such as all objects that satisfy a particular
function or requisite, one means something slightly more abstract than a particular instance
of an object itself. In order to produce a notion similar to the examples: ‘all chairs’ or ‘all
electrons’, one must construct a relationship among a set of wi’s, each of which is a set of, say,
n observations: wA, wB, . . . ∈ W ′ ⊂W . Let
wA =
NA⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jw
(A)
i , (20)
wB =
NB⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jw
(B)
i , etc. (21)
w
(A)
i , w
(B)
i , . . . ∈ W. (22)
Then, {wA, wB, . . .} =
n⋃
j′=1
Nj′⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W ′,i′,j′Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jw
(i′)
i . (23)
The relationship itself that constitutes the ‘type’ thus takes the form:
rtype = A
′ ◦
n⋃
j′=1
Nj′⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W ′,i′,j′Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jw
(i′)
i ∈ Ω
3(W ) (= Ω2(W ′)), (24)
for some A′, and W ′ = Ω1(W )†. This formula represents the notion of ‘types’ of object in a
fairly general fashion, in order to resemble as closely as possible the way in which objects are
typically characterised and subsequently handled in the frameworks of language and thought.
4.2.3 Generalised objects
Up until now, discussion of the nature of the real-world objects {wi} ∈ W has been avoided.
However, in order to incorporate them in the most general way into the framework of the
abstraction algebra, one may posit that the real-world objects are simply a chain of successive
projection or abstraction operators. In general, one can construct ‘sandwiches’, such as:
A1 ◦ · · · ◦ Ai1 ◦ P ◦ A2 ◦ · · · . (25)
†The form, W ′ = Ω1(W ), makes sense, in that the notion of ‘being a subset’ is a single-level abstraction,
residing in Ω1.
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All objects considered in the framework thus far can be expressed in this form, noting that
P(anything) ∈ Ω0P(anything). Due to the corollary in Eq. (13), the projection operators
cannot be ‘swapped’ with any of the abstraction operators, and so the structure of the object is
nontrivial. Let c denote a generalised object, living in the space:
c ∈ Ωi1P Ωi2P · · ·P Ωin(W ) ≡ Ci1i2...inW . (26)
The space W here could stand for any other general space constructed in this manner, not
necessarily the space inhabited by c itself; thus Eq. (26) is not recursive as it may initially
appear. Because the internal structure, so-to-speak, of c contains a collection of a possible
many abstractions, it may be expressed in terms of type. Here are two examples:
Let c(1) = P{P ◦ A1(w), . . . ,P ◦ An(w)} ∈ Ω0P Ω1P Ω1(w) = C011w (27)
= P
n⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
2
Ω1,i,jPAi(w). (28)
Or c(2) = P{P(w1), . . . ,P(wn)} ∈ Ω0P Ω1P Ω0(W ) = C010W (29)
= P
n⋃
j=1
Aset ◦Φ
1
W,i,jP(wi), (30)
where, in the first case, Ω0(w) ∈ Ω0(W ).
Consider the behaviour of an AnsatzZ = P◦AZ acting on a generalised object c ∈ Ci1...inW :
Z ◦ c = P ◦ AZ ◦ A1 ◦ · · · ◦ Ai1 ◦ P ◦ · · · . (31)
Z maps c into a space C0i1+1...inW . If we define rank(c)= n, then rank(Z ◦ c)= n+ 1. Note that
the rank of Z ∈ C01c can also be read off easily: rank(Z)= 2. Objects of the form of Z are the
principal rank 2 Ansa¨tze. Note that other rank 2 objects besides Z exits, such as objects of the
form P ◦ A1 ◦ A2.
A more general description of Ansa¨tze also exist, analogously to the generalised objects.
By constructing an object of the form: χ = A ◦ · · · ◦ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
j1
◦ P ◦ A ◦ · · · ◦ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
j2
◦P ◦ · · · , that is,
for an object residing in a space Cj1 j2...jmc , the composition χ ◦ c lies in Cj1...(jm+i1)...inW , which
is of rank n+m− 1.
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By convention, an Ansatz must contain a projection operator. Therefore, there is no rank 1
Ansatz, and we arrive at our general definition of Ansatz:
Any object acting on c, with a rank > 1, is an Ansatz. (32)
In addition, there are no objects with rank ≤ 0.
Proof: Let ξ exist such that rank(ξ)≤ 0, and c ∈ Ci1...inW . Then:
rank(ξ ◦ c) = rank(ξ)+rank(c)− 1 < rank(c) = n
⇒ ξ ◦ c ∈ C
i′1...i
′
n−1
W
⇒ ξ is of the form X ◦
k⋃
j=1
P−1 ◦
ij⋃
i=1
A−1i,L, where rank(X)≤ k
⇒ ξ DNE, for any X .
For example, in the case k = 1, X is a rank 1 Ansatz, and ξ = X ◦ P−1 ◦
⋃i1
i=1A
−1
i,L, such
that ξ ◦ c ∈ Ci2...inW ∼= C
i′1...i
′
n−1
W . The rank of ξ ◦ c is n − 1, and the rank of ξ is therefore 0.
Because of the usage of the operation P−1, such an object is inadmissible.
We would like to use the Ansa¨tze to investigate the properties of generalised objects. How-
ever, there are a variety of properties in particular, discussion of which shall occupy the next
section. The notion of ‘existence’ is a key example that urgently requires clarification, and
it will be found that such a property (and those similar to it), when treated as an abstraction,
must have additional constraints.
4.3 I-extantness
Firstly, one must make a careful distinction between what is meant by ‘existence’ in the sense
of mathematical objects, and in the sense of the ‘real world’. In the former case, one may
assume that an object exists if it can be defined in a logically consistent manner. In the latter
case, it is a nontrivial property of an object, which must be investigated on a case-by-case basis,
and the alternative word ‘extantness’ will be used in order to avoid confusion. The goal of the
formalism is to relate the two terms- that an object’s extantness can be tested by appealing to
the existence (in the mathematical sense) of some construction.
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We begin by assuming that extantness is an inferred property of an object, and thus added
by an Ansatz. Define its abstraction, AE, such that an object c = P ◦ AE(w) is extant if
such a construction exists; i.e. c is extant if it can be written in this form (for any w). For
c = P ◦ AE ◦ A1 ◦ · · · ∈ C
i1...in
W ; the operator AE must occur in the left-most position of all
the abstractions in c. Clearly then, it must not necessarily be the case that P ◦AE(w) exists, if
this abstraction is to be equivalent to how extantness (or existence in the conventional sense)
is understood.
Example: Consider the object P ◦AE(1), where 1 is the abstraction identity. AE(1) = AE
is the extantness itself, and P ◦ AE is ‘what is meant’ by extantness, which is itself extant- it
is the trivial extant object.
This leads us to the first property of AE, that its right inverse, A−1E,R, does not exist, as
anticipated in Section 4.1.4.
Proof: Consider c = P ◦A◦ · · · (w) such that it is not extant. AssumeA−1E,R exists also. Then:
c = P ◦ AE ◦ A
−1
E,R ◦ A ◦ · · · (w)
= P ◦ AE(w
′), wherew′ ≡ A−1E,R(w)
⇒ c is extant. ⇒⇐
It is not necessary at this stage to suppose that the left inverse of AE does not exist either;
however, if that were the case, then AE would share a property with P , in lacking an inverse.
The two are unlike, however, in that AE ◦ AE 6= AE. Since AE lives in a restricted class
Ω˜1 ⊂ Ω1, indicating the additional constraint of lacking an inverse, then the level addition
property of Eq. (8) means AE ◦ AE ∈ Ω˜2 6≡ Ω˜1. A further consequence of the non-existence
of A−1E,L is that the statement AE(a) = AE(b) does not mean that a = b. One may interpret
this as the fact that two abstractions may simply be labels for the same extant object. Note that
the definition of the literal commutator requires the existence of an inverse of each abstraction
operator that occurs in sequence to the left of the object being commuted, but that is not the
case for auxiliary commutators.
Recalling the supposition of physics, that PS(w) spans at least W , a further clarification
may now be added:
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Supposition 2. All extants have Ansa¨tze, but not all elements of P(W ) or PS(w) are extants.
From the point of view of Mathematical Realism, one would argue that projected quanti-
ties, P ◦ · · · , are those which are ‘real’ (and not dependent on their extantness), since such a
definition of ‘real’ would then encompass a larger variety of objects, regardless of their par-
ticular realisation in our universe. Such a semantic choice for the word ‘real’ seems to align
best with the philosophy of Mathematical Realism. Nevertheless, it is still important to have a
mechanism in the formalism to determine the extantness of an object.
Although extantness has been singled out as a key property, a similar argument may be
made for the truth of a statement, whose abstraction can be denoted as AT . Like extantness,
the object P ◦AT (w) may not exist for every w, and the trivially true object is P ◦AT (1). Let
us label all properties of this sort, ‘I-extantness’, since their enumeration in terms of common
words is not of interest here. For any I-extant abstraction AI , we call C˜i1...inW the restricted
class of generalised objects, cI .
A formula is now derived, which is able to distinguish between objects that are I-extant and
those that are not, by virtue of their mathematical existence. Consider the case that P ◦AI(w1)
exists, butP◦AI(w2) does not. w1 must contain an addition property,AI′ , that is not present in
w2. UnlikeAI , it is not required thatAI′ occur in a particular spot in the list of abstractions that
comprisew1. Nor is there a restriction in the construction of an inverse, which would prevent a
commutator notation being employed. Let w1 be represented by a collection of objects defined
by: w1 = {AI′ ◦A◦ · · · ,A◦AI′ ◦ · · · , etc.}. That is, w1 takes the form of a set of generalised
objects, c, but for the replacement of an operator, A, with AI′. It is important to note that
the AI′ that distinguishes w1 from a non-extant object, such as w2, is particular to w1. For
an object c to be extant, it would have to include an abstraction AcI′ , specific to c; otherwise,
any object related to c in any way would also be extant, which doesn’t reflect the behaviour
expected of extant objects in the universe.
In commutator notation, one would need to write out a geometric composition of the form
w1 = Aset
i1−1⋃
m=0
Φ
i1−m+1
Ωi1−m(w),m+1,I′H1 ◦ P ◦
i2−1⋃
m′=0
Φ
i2−m′+1
Ωi2−m
′
(w),m′+1,I′H2 ◦ · · · , (33)
= Aset ◦H1 ◦
n⋃
p=2
P
ip−1⋃
m=0
Φ
ip−m+1
Ωip−m(w),m+1,I′Hp, (34)
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for c = H1 ◦ P ◦ H2 ◦ · · · . A more elegant formula may be defined simply in terms of c
itself, without the need of introducing new symbols, H1, . . . , Hn. One can achieve this using
auxiliary commutators
w1 =
{
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n
j=1 ij)+1
C
i1...in
W , 1, I
′ c,
ˆ
Φ
∑n
j=1 ij
C
i1−1...in
W , 2, I
′c, . . . ,
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−1
j=1 ij)+1
C1...inW , i1, I
′ c, . . . ,
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−2
j=1 ij)+1
C1...inW , i2, I
′ c, . . .
}
(35)
=
i1−1⋃
m=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1−m...in
W ,m+1, I
′c ∪
i2−1⋃
m′=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−1
j=1 ij)+1−m
′
C
i2−m
′...in
W ,m
′+1, I′c ∪ · · · (36)
=
n⋃
p=1
ip−1⋃
m=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1...ip−m...in
W ,m+1, I
′c. (37)
It follows then, that a generalised object that is I-extant takes the form
cI = P ◦ AI ◦
n⋃
p=1
ip−1⋃
m=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1...ip−m...in
W ,m+1, I
′c, (38)
where cI is of the form P ◦ AI(wI). This is a powerful formula, as it represents the condition
for I-extantness for a generalised object, c. Note that it would be just as correct to define cI
as an element of a set characterised by the righthand side (i.e. using ‘∈’ instead of ‘=’), but
because the notion of a ‘set’, Aset, is simply an element of Ω1, it can be incorporated into the
general form of Ci1...inW .
One might wonder how to relate the properties of a proof (i.e. verifying the truth of a state-
ment) with the existence of an abstraction,AT ′ . In a example, consider the object representing
the existence of truth, wT . The validity of the ‘excluded middle’29 in this situation means that
the proof is very simple:
Proof:
wT ⇒ wT
¬wT ⇒ (¬¬wT ) = wT .
SincewT is the statement of truth itself, i.e. wT = P◦AT , the inconsistency of P◦AT (wT )
means the inconsistency of P ◦AT . Such a statement is not true by construction. One can now
identify the abstraction, AwTT ′ as being AT itself. Thus, this exercise demonstrates that the
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proof of a statement has consequences for the abstract form of the statement, allowing one
to identify more specific properties. Note that this does not, at this stage, provide extra proof
methods, since there is no procedure, as yet, for acquiring knowledge of the form of an object’s
relevant AT ′ in advance. The content of the proof must rely on standard means.
4.4 Cardinality
In the derivation of the general condition for an object c to be I-extant (Eq. (38)), one arrives
at a set of elements. In this notation, the set is not intended to specify all the possibilities that
each abstraction operator, A, can take. Rather, the set can be thought of as being ‘the set of
alterations from a general c’ that encompass the required condition.
If one seeks an absolute measure of the ‘size’ of the object, in terms of the overall pos-
sibilities, one may define a type of cardinality, |c|, in terms of the total possible number of
abstractions. Recalling Cantor’s Theorem,25 there is no consistent description of such a uni-
versal class. However, since the formalism accommodates the imposition of restrictions on
the kind of objects that can be represented, let the number of possibilities for A be assumed
consistently definable, and denote as L. L need not be finite, nor even countable, however, it
can be used to obtain formulae for the cardinality of an object.
Define the number of abstractions, A, in c ∈ Ci1...inW as n¯ ≡
∑n
j=1 ij . Thus one finds that
|c| = Ln¯, and (39)
|cI | = n¯ L
n¯−1. (40)
The latter formula is simply a consequence of there being n¯ possibilities for restricting one
abstraction operator to be AI′ . If one enforces N restrictions on the set of A’s, then it follows
that
|cN | =
(
1
2
(n¯2 −N2) + 1
)
Ln¯−N . (41)
This formula will become relevant in the next section.
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5 Unreasonable effectiveness
The goal is to use the general framework, described in Section 4, is to encapsulate the essence
of describing phenomena using a theory, in the sense used in physics. Thus, the issue of
Wigner’s ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of mathematics13 to describe the universe may be ad-
dressed by transporting the problem to a metaphysical context. There, the tools from philoso-
phy, such as logic and proof theory, can be directed at the question that involves not so much
the behaviour of the universe, as the behaviour of descriptions of the universe (i.e. physics
itself). It is important to be able to transport certain features of physics into a context where
an analysis may take place, and such a context is, by definition, metaphysics.
The notion of ‘effectiveness’ is that, given a consistent set of phenomena, vi ∈ V , One can
extend V to include more phenomena such that (general) Ansa¨tze able to explain the phenom-
ena satisfactorily can still be found. In this general context, what is meant by an ‘explanation’
will be taken to be a relationship among the phenomena, vi, in the form of abstractions. The
essence of the mystery of the effectiveness of mathematics is not whether one can always
‘draw a box’ around an arbitrary collection of objects, or that laws and principles (of any kind)
are obeyed, but the identification of particular principle(s) such that phenomena v1, v2, . . . are
consequences of them; and that via the principles, the whole of V may be obtained, indicating
a more full explanation of the phenomena. That is, the phenomena are extant because of the
truth of the underlying principles, rather than being identified ‘by hand’ (which would hold no
predictive power in the scientific sense). Note that the set V may, in fact, only include a subset
of the possible phenomena to discover in the universe, and so would represent a subset of the
set, W , as discussed in Section 4.
Let v1, v2 . . . have descriptions Av1 ,Av2, . . . ∈ V ⊂ W , which are extant. Let there be
some principle, (or even collection of principles with complicated inter-dependencies), de-
scribed by the general object, cprinc, such that each element of V may be enumerated. It is our
goal to investigate under what conditions the following statement holds:
cprinc is true ⇒ v1, v2, . . . are extant, (42)
i.e.
[
cprinc = P ◦ AT (wprinc)
]
⇒
[
Avi = P ◦ AE(Ayi) ∈ V
]
. (43)
If there is a principle that implies such a statement, we wish to identify it, and investigate
whether or not it is true.
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The circumstances of the truth of Eq. (43) depends on how wprinc is related to the phe-
nomena, vi. wprinc itself represents principle(s) whose truth is not added by hand in Ansatz
form. This does not mean that it is not true, since the form of wprinc is as yet unspecified. The
most general way of relating wprinc and all vi’s is to use the method of substituting abstractions
into the formula for a generalised object, such as that used to derive the general condition of
I-extantness in Eq. (38). In the same way that the set of all possible locations of AI′ in c
was considered, here, all possible combinations of locations of abstractions describing vi in c
must be considered, such that each Avi occurs at least once. This formula can be developed
inductively.
Consider only two phenomena, v1 and v2, with corresponding abstract descriptions defined
as Av1 and Av2 . For a generalised object, c ∈ Ci1...inW , one finds
w
(N=2)
princ =
n⋃
p=1
ip−1⋃
m′=0
m′ 6=m
ip−1⋃
m=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
′
C
i1...ip−m
′...in
W ,m
′+1,v2
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1...ip−m...in
W ,m+1,v1
c. (44)
In the case of N phenomena, it is assumed that N ≤ ip: the number of abstractions avail-
able in the general formula for c may be made arbitrary large to accommodate the number of
phenomena. One may make use of the following formula
ip−1⋃
m(N−1)=0
m(N−1) 6=any other m’s
· · ·
ip−1⋃
m(2)=0
m(2) 6=m(1)
ip−1⋃
m(1)=0
=
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
m(k,ip)∈[0,ip−1]\
⋃k
µ=0{m
(µ)}
. (45)
Here, [0, ip− 1] is the closed interval from 0 to ip− 1 in the set of integers, and for brevity, we
define {m(0)} as the empty set: ∅. The most general form of wprinc may now be written as
wGprinc =
n⋃
p=1
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
m∈[0,ip−1]\
⋃k
µ=0{m
(µ)}
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1...ip−m...in
W ,m+1,vk+1
c. (46)
In order for cprinc to be true, wprinc must contain information about the objects yi, such that
Avi = P ◦ AE(Ayi). Therefore, we seek only those elements of Eq. (46) such that the phe-
nomena vi take this form. This is a more restrictive set, as each abstraction of yi must be
applied to the right of AE , which must be applied to the right of P . There are only n− 1 such
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occurrences of P in c, so in making this restriction, we are free to choose
• N ≤ n− 1, (47)
• N ≤ ip. (48)
The form of the more restricted version of wprinc is thus
wRprinc =
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
p∈[2,n]\
⋃k
pi=0{p
(pi)}
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+2
j=1 ij)+1
C
i1...ip...in
W
,1,E
ˆ
Φ
∑n−p+2
j=1 ij
C
i1...ip−1...in
W
,2,yk+1
c, (49)
where {p(0)} = ∅.
If cprinc can be constructed consistently, i.e. if it exists, then the form of wprinc must be
restricted to include an abstraction, AwprincT ′ , that ensures the existence of cprinc. This uses the
same argument as in deriving Eq. (38), with cT = P ◦ AT (wT ), and involves the union of
Eq. (49) with the object wT . Thus, the condition under which Eq. (43) is true can now be
written.
Theorem 3. The condition under which the principles of a theory describe certain phenomena
takes the form
wprinc ⊆ w
R,T ′
princ =
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
p∈[2,n]\
⋃k
pi=0{p
(pi)}
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+2
j=1 ij)+1
C
i1...ip...in
W
,1,E
ˆ
Φ
∑n−p+2
j=1 ij
C
i1...ip−1...in
W
,2,yk+1
c ∪ wT .
(50)
Proof: The statement of the theorem, that ‘wprinc ⊆ wR,T ′princ constitutes the condition for which
Eq. (43) is true’, is only fulfilled if the general form ofwprinc (in Eq. (46)) includes a description
of extant phenomena explicitly, which takes the form shown in Eq. (49). That is, one must
show that wR,T
′
princ ⊆ w
G,T ′
princ. This entails that the elements of w
R,T ′
princ and w
G,T ′
princ are of the same
form, differing only by use of a restriction. Therefore, in this case, the abstraction AwprincT ′ is
sufficient to ensure the truth of the elements in both sets. Note that the inclusion ofAwprincT ′ takes
the same form for both wR,T
′
princ and w
G,T ′
princ. Therefore, it is sufficient to show thatwRprinc ⊆ wGprinc.
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Express Eq. (49) in terms of abstractions, Avi , recalling that P ◦ AE(Ayi) =
P ◦ P ◦ AE(Ayi) = P ◦ Avi:
wRprinc =
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
p∈[2,n]\
⋃k
pi=0{p
(pi)}
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+2
j=1 ij)+1
C
i1...ip...in
W ,1,vk+1
c. (51)
Choosing the value m = 0 in wGprinc yields
w
G,T ′
princ,m=0 =
n⋃
p=1
N−1⋃
k=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1
C
i1...ip...in
W ,1,vk+1
c. (52)
The only difference between Eqs. (51) and (52) is the choice of values of the iterator p. To
obtain wRprinc ⊆ wGprinc, it is sufficient to show that
[2, n]\
k⋃
pi=0
{p(pi)} ⊆ [2, n] ∀k ∈ [0, N − 1]. (53)
Recalling the restrictions of Eqs. (47) and (48), take N ≪ n. Now, ⋃kpi=1{p(pi)} is a finite set
of integers that is a subset of [2, n]
k⋃
pi=1
{p(pi)} ⊆ [2, n],
where {p(0)} = ∅.
∴
k⋃
pi=0
{p(pi)} ⊆ [2, n]
⇒ wR,T
′
princ ⊆ w
G,T ′
princ.
Note that the fact that wR,T
′
princ is a more restrictive set than w
G,T ′
princ does not mean that it is
‘smaller’ in the sense of cardinality. Assuming a sufficiently large n value to accommodate all
N + 1 restrictions, one finds that
|wG,T
′
princ| =
(
1
2
(n¯2 − (N + 1)2) + 1
)
Ln¯−(N+1) = |wR,T
′
princ| (54)
⇒ wR,T
′
princ
∼= w
G,T ′
princ. (55)
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The above observation provides a possible explanation for the appearance of the ‘unreason-
able effectiveness’ of mathematics. The set of relationships among extant phenomena, wR,T
′
princ,
is not smaller, in any strict sense, than the general set of relationships among abstractions,
wG.T
′
princ. The countability of sets of phenomena filtering into a more restrictive and still count-
able form, wR,T
′
princ, combined with the formalism for describing non-mathematical objects in a
mathematical way, constitutes the metaphysical explanation for the ‘unreasonable effective-
ness’ of mathematics. In other words, there is no unreasonableness at all, but it is simply a
mathematical consequence of the countability of phenomena, and the abstract description of
objects that are not innately abstract.
This demonstrates the power of metaphysical tools, in the form of principles and proofs,
to address key philosophical issues in physics. That is, the process employed here was not
physics itself, but philosophical argumentation applied to the abstractions of objects used in
the practice of physics.
6 Evidence for universes
6.1 Defining evidence
The definition of evidence relies on the connection between a set of phenomena (called evi-
dence), and the principles of a theory that the evidence supports. It is assumed here that the
sense in which the phenomena support or demonstrate an abstraction, such as the theory, is the
same sense in which a theory can be said to entail the extantness of the phenomena. The sym-
metry between the two arguments has not been proved, however, since it relies on the precise
details of often-imprecisely defined linguistic devices.
The description of evidence, using the formalism of Section 4, takes a similar form to
that of the description of Ansatz for phenomena in Eq. (43), except that the direction of the
correspondence is reversed
Av1, Av2, . . . are extant ⇒ cprinc is true, (56)
i.e.
[
Avi = P ◦ AE(Ayi) ∈ V
]
⇒
[
cprinc = P ◦ AT (wprinc)
]
. (57)
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The lefthand side of Eq. (57) restricts the form of the object, wprinc (representing the set
of principles) through wprinc ⊆ wRprinc. For the form of wprinc to entail the righthand side of
Eq. (57), it must also include the abstraction, AT ′ . Thus, the condition under which Eq. (57)
is true, where phenomena constitute evidence for a set of principles, is
[
wprinc ⊆ w
R,T ′
princ
]
(= ccond). (58)
This is the same condition obtained for the examination of principles entailing extant phenom-
ena, in Eq. (43).
There is a duality between the two scenarios, which can be expressed in the following
manner. If the condition of Eqs. (50) and (58) is true, then
[
cprinc = P ◦ AT (wprinc)
]
⇔
[
Avi = P ◦ AE(Ayi)
]
. (59)
That is, relationship between principles and evidence is symmetrical in a sense. The sort of
phenomena entailed by a theory is of exactly the same nature as the sort of phenomena that
constitutes evidence for such a theory. This leads one to postulate an object, cD = P◦AT (wD),
which represents this duality, and one may identify a Duality Theorem, which takes the form
wD =
{[
P ◦ AT (wcond)
]
⇒
[(
cprinc = P ◦ AT (wprinc)
)
⇔
(
Avi = P ◦ AE(Ayi)
)]}
.
(60)
The theorem is a consequence of the fact that the application of the restrictions acting upon
wprinc commute with each other in the formalism.
Note that, in attempting to clarify a term ill-defined in colloquial usage, we have arrived at
quite a strict definition of evidence: if wprinc is to constitute a set of principles describing the
elements, vi, it must at least take the form of a description based explicitly on all vi elements.
Any part of wprinc that does not lie in wR,T
′
princ is not relevant for consideration as being supported
by the evidence.
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6.2 The relating theorem and the fundamental object
Since the I-extantness of some cI has been related to the mathematical existence of an object
AI(w), a primary question to investigate would be the I-extantness of the statement of this re-
lation itself. The statement of ‘the tying-in of the mathematical and non-mathematical objects’
has certain properties that should deem the investigation of its own I-extantness a nontrivial
exercise.
Denote the above statement, which is an Ansatz, as ZI(cI), and let cI be I-extant. That is,
for cI ≡ P ◦ AI(w), AI(w) exists; and let ZI(cI) ≡ P ◦ AZ ◦ cI , for some AZ . Recall that
the assumed existence (in the mathematical sense) of the statement, ZI(cI), does not trivially
entail I-extantness, under Supposition 2. To show that ZI is I-extant, it is required that it can
be put in the form
ZI(cI) = P ◦ AI(wZ), (61)
which implies that
P ◦ AZ ◦ cI = P ◦ AI(wZ). (62)
We would like to attempt to understand under what conditions this holds.
Consider the scenario in which the I-extant form of ZI does not exist. In this case, it is not
possible to say that ZI is not I-extant, since the statement relating existence and I-extantness
has not been proved, and no information about I-extantness can be gained using this method.
If, however, the I-extant form of ZI does exist, then it is indeed certain that ZI is I-extant. In
other words, there is a logical subtlety that entails an ‘asymmetry’: the demonstration of the ex-
istence of an object is enough to prove it, but the equivalent demonstration of its non-existence
is not enough to disprove it, since the relied-upon postulate would then be undermined. There-
fore, in this particular situation, unless further a logical restriction is found to be necessary to
add in later versions of the formalism, it is sufficient to show that the I-extant can exist, for ZI
to be I-extant. This is not true in general, due to Supposition 2.
Theorem 4. ZI(cI) is I-extant.
The above theorem, denoted the relating theorem, may be verified in proving Eq. (62). It
is enough to show that AZ ◦ cI = AI ◦ wZ for any cI , where there exists an AZ such that AI
obeys the property: A−1I,R DNE, which is, in our general framework, the only distinguishing
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feature of AI at this point. The demonstration is as follows:
Proof: Let ZI exist, such that
ZI = AZ ◦ P ◦ AI ◦
n⋃
p=1
ip−1⋃
m=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1...ip−m...in
W , m+1, I
′c
= AI ◦ wZ ,
for any wZ . Due to the labelling principle, this can only be true if wZ ≡ cI and AI ≡ AZ ;
that is, the abstraction of cI (above) is an I-abstraction: AZ ∈ Ω˜1(W ). This is a valid choice,
since the existence of A−1Z,R was not assumed.
Therefore, the form of ZI is now known:
ZI(cI) = P ◦ AI(cI) (63)
= PAI ◦ PAI(w). (64)
In words, what has been discovered is that the Ansatz of I-extantness is equivalent to the
Ansatz in the statement ‘the I-extantness of cI is related to existence’. That is, the operation
associated with, say, ‘it is I-extant’ (P ◦ AI(w)), when applied twice, forms the statement
‘its I-extantness is related to existence’ (PAI ◦ PAI(w)); and it is the same operation. This
needn’t be the case in general, and so it is a nontrivial result that
ZI = P ◦ AI . (65)
Note that Eq. (65), in this case, is not a definition, but a theorem, to be known as the corre-
spondence corollary to the relating theorem.
In a sense,ZI is the fundamental I-extant object, in that it is the most obvious starting point
for the analysis of the existence of I-extant objects in general. It also constitutes the first ex-
ample of an object demonstrated to exist in a universe (though, a clarification of distinguishing
different universes is still required, and investigated in Section 6.3).
Recall, in construction of ‘types’ in Eq. (24), that familiar notions such as ‘chair’, or other
such objects, are brought into a recognisable shape using this formula. Though the types may
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not appear more recognisable at face value, the properties of such a construction align more
closely with what is meant phenomenologically but such objects. In a similar fashion, the type
of ZI can be established, to created a more full, complete, or ‘dressed’ version of the object.
ZI is an example of a cI . Since projected objects cannot be related directly, a type will be
constructed from instances of AI (of which AE is one), and the dressed fundamental object
will be a projection of the type. Using the same argument used in deriving Eq. (24), the set of
n observed instances of AI takes the following form (acting on some set W ′)
n⋃
j′=1
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
2
Ω˜1(W ′),i′,j′A
i′
I (W
′). (66)
If each observed instance may be identified as the set of a certain N characteristics residing in
W , then our intermediate set W ′ can be dropped, and we find
AI ◦
Ni′⋃
j=1
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
1
W,i,jw
(i′)
i ∈ A
i′
I (Ω
1(W )). (67)
In this case, an instance ofAi′I contains more information than just a set of characteristics, since
it is also known that it is I-extant. Therefore, it contains an additional abstraction operator.
What is meant by the fundamental type therefore takes the form
RZ ≡ PrZ = P A
′ ◦
n⋃
j′=1
Nj′⋃
j=1
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
1
W,i′,j′AI ◦ Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
1
W,i,jw
(i′)
i ∈ P Ω
2 ◦ Ω˜1 ◦ Ω1(W ),
(68)
whereA′ is the abstraction of relationship. Note thatRZ is, in general, an element ofPΩ4(W ).
6.3 Distinguishing universes
In this section, we address the issue of classifying universes by their properties in a general
fashion. An attempt can then be made to identify features that distinguish universes from one
another, and thus clarify the definition of our own universe in a way that is convenient in the
practice of physics.
Suppose the definition of a universe, U , to be the ‘maximal’ list of objects that have the
same character, that is, obeying the same list of basic properties. The list need not necessarily
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be finite, as each collection of properties could, in principle, represent a collection of infinitely
many objects themselves. In the language of the formalism developed so far, a formula may
be constructed from a generalised object c by ensuring that each element of U is related to the
content of the underlying principles, wprinc. This formula will be analogous to Eq. (46).
Supposition 3. ∃U , such that a list of underlying principles may be configured to be enu-
merable as a countable set, wprinc = u1 ∪ · · · ∪ uN , for N elements. (It is not required that
u1 ∪ · · · ∪ uN ∈ U). A universe based on these principles is the object represented by the
largest possible set of the form:
U = P ◦
n⋃
p=1
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
m∈[0,ip−1]\
⋃k
µ=0{m
(µ)}
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+1
j=1 ij)+1−m
C
i1...ip−m...in
W ,m+1,uk+1
c, (69)
with respect to a generalised object, c.
Note that extantness is a universal property, in that it can be defined in the formalism
regardless of the universe in which it is extant. It may, but it is not required that it constitute
one of the N underlying principles of a universe.
The distinction between different universes is largely convention, based on the most con-
venient definition in practising physics. One such convenience is the ability to arrive at a
consistent definition of the universe. This is not the case for a naı¨vely defined universe re-
quired to contain all possible objects, due to Cantor’s Theorem.25 In order to establish two
universes as distinct, the following convention is adopted:
Supposition 4. Consider two consistently definable universes U and U ′. If the universe defined
as the union, X ≡ U ∪ U ′ is inconsistent, then the universes U and U ′ are distinct.
Introducing a square-bracket notation, where U [. . .] indicates that the underlying principles
to be used in defining U are listed in [. . .], one may write U = U [wprinc] and U ′ = U [w′princ].
Define the following lists of principles to be consistent:
wprinc = u1 ∪ · · ·uN−1, (70)
w′princ = uN ∪ u
′
1 ∪ · · ·u
′
N ′, (71)
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but suppose the inclusion of both principles uN−1 and uN to lead to inconsistency. It then
follows that
X ≡ U [u1 ∪ · · ·uN−1] ∪ U
′[uN ∪ u
′
1 ∪ · · ·u
′
N ′] is inconsistent. (72)
Example: The inconsistency of a set of principles can emerge in the combination of negation
and recursion, as clearly demonstrated by Go¨del30 and Tarski.31 If uN−1 were to express a
negation, such as ‘only contains elements that don’t contain themselves’, and uN were to
enforce a recursion, such as ‘contains all elements’, then Russell’s paradox would result.32
6.4 Evidence for other universes
The final denouement is to demonstrate that the fundamental type constitutes evidence for a
universe distinct from our own. Consider N abstract objects, Avk , each of which represents
an element of the fundamental type in Eq. (68). They may be expressed analogously to the
operator Ai′I defined in Eq. (67), for N sub-characteristics:
Avk ≡ P ◦ AI ◦
N⋃
j=1
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
1
W,i,jw
(k)
i . (73)
Though the sub-characteristics themselves are not vital in this investigation, one can simply
see that the objects are I-extant (by construction), by expressing them in the form:
Avk = P ◦ AI(Ayk) ∈ V
′, (74)
where V ′ denotes a set that contains at least all N elements, Avk . By determining the under-
lying principles describing V ′, one may denote its maximal set as U ′. Since V ′ is an abstract
object existing as a subset of the objects that comprise our formalism, F , it follows that U ′ is
the set of all abstracts, and cannot be consistently defined.25 That is, by taking the maximal
set of objects obeying this restriction, one arrives at a set containing itself, and all possible
abstract objects, which is Cantor’s universal set. This does not mean, however, that V ′ itself is
inconsistent; since V ′ ⊂ F ⊂ U ′, we are free to assume that V ′ is constructed in such a way
as to render it consistent, just as was assumed for F .
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Now consider our universe, U , which takes the form of Eq. (69), with the restriction that
one of its underlying principles must be that all elements are extant. That is, let U only contain
elements of the form w = P ◦ AE(c) ∈ U . U may be still be consistently defined. Since U ′ is
inconsistent, the definition of a composite universeX ≡ U∪U ′ is also inconsistent. Therefore,
by the convention established in Supposition 4, U and U ′ are distinct. It also follows that
V ′ ⊂ U ′ is also distinct from U .
The pertinent underlying principle for V ′ is simply that it be consistent; or more specifi-
cally, that an extant description of it be consistent:
w′princ = Y
′, such that V ′ = P ◦ AE(Y ′), (75)
for some consistently definable Y ′. It is reasonable to expect that the elements that comprise
V ′ constitute evidence for the extantness of V ′ ∈ U ′. This can be checked by determining that
the condition for evidence is satisfied:
w′princ ⊆ w
R,T ′
princ[vk]. (76)
This condition, however, is not satisfied in general, due to the fact that Y ′ must contain an ab-
straction,AE′ , which is not present in the general formulation of wR,T
′
princ. This makes sense that
the truth of a statement does not necessarily entail an extantness. In the specific case above,
though, we have considered the fundamental type of the general I-extantness, encompassing
all abstractions of a specific form, as described in Section 4.3. In this special case, the ex-
tantness required by both sides of Eq. (76) is the same, and we are required to demonstrate
that
w′princ = Y
′ ⊆ wR,I
′
princ[vk], (77)
for V ′ = P ◦ AI(Y ′). (78)
Proof: Y ′ is a set containing N + 1 abstractions,Avk , with AN+1 ≡ AI′:
Y ′ = {Av1 , . . . ,AvN ,AI′} =
N⋃
k=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
1
V ′,i,kAvi . (79)
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The righthand side of Eq. (77) takes the form:
w
R,I′
princ =
N−1⋃
k=0
⋃
p∈[2,n]\
⋃k
pi=0{p
(pi)}
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
(
∑n−p+2
j=1 ij)+1
C
i1...ip...in
W
,1,vk+1
c ∪ wI . (80)
The left term can be pared down by choosing n = 2, i1 = 0 and i2 = 1, and the right term, wI ,
by choosing n = 1, i1 = 1:
⇒
( N⋃
k=1
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
2
PΩ1(W ),1,vk+1
c
)
∪
(
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
2
Ω1(W ),m+1,I′c
)
= {PAv1(w), . . . ,PAvN (w)} ∪ {AI′(w)}
=
N⋃
k=0
Aset ◦
ˆ
Φ
1
V ′,i,kAvi, for AN+1 ≡ AI′.
The final line follows from the labelling principle, P ◦ P = P , and the fact that each Avk
is in extant form, P ◦ AI(Ayk).
7 Conclusion
This manuscript has attempted to address key issues in physics from the point of view of phi-
losophy. By adopting a metaphysical framework closely aligned with that used in the practice
of physics, the philosophical tool of Ansatz was examined, and the process of its use was clar-
ified. In this context, a mathematical formalism for describing intrinsically non-mathematical
objects was expounded. In examining the consistency of such a framework, a careful dis-
tinction between existence (in the mathematical sense) and ‘extantness’ (in the sense of phe-
nomena existing in the universe) was made. Using the formalism, a general condition for
extantness was derived in terms of a generalised object, which incorporates the salient fea-
tures of abstraction and projection to the non-mathematical world in a way easily manipulated.
In principle, the formalism may make verifiable predictions, since properties (and the conse-
quences of combinations of properties in the form of theorems) can be arranged to make strict
statements about the behaviour or nature of a system or other general objects.
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As an example, a possible explanation of Wigner’s ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of math-
ematics was derived. This demonstrates the ability of a metaphysical framework to address
important mysteries inaccessible from within the physics itself being described.
Lastly, an attempt was made to classify other universes in a general fashion, and to clarify
the characteristics and role of evidence for theories that provides at least a partial description
of a universe. The connection between phenomena that constitute evidence and the theory
itself was established in a Duality Theorem. Instead of focusing on attempting an ad-hoc
identification of extra-universal phenomena from experiment, the formalism was used to derive
basic properties of objects that do not align with our universe. As a first example toward
such a goal, a fundamental object was identified, which satisfies the necessary properties of
evidence, and whose extantness does not coincide with our universe. This paves the way for
future investigations into more precise details of the properties (perhaps initially bizarre and
unexpected) that objects may possess outside our universe.
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